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Abstract 
Cellucci, C., Existential instantiation and normalization in sequent natural deduction, Annals 
of Pure and Applied Logic 58 (1992) 111-148. 
A sequent conclusion natural deduction system is introduced in which classical logic is treated 
per se, not as a special case of intuitionistic logic. The system includes an existential 
instantiation rule and involves restrictions on the discharge rules. Contrary to the standard 
formula conclusion natural deduction systems for classical logic, its normal derivations satisfy 
both the subformula property and the separation property and allow to establish a version of 
the midsequent theorem and Herbrand’s theorem. 
0. Introduction 
Comparing the merits of Gentzen’s [6] natural deduction system NK and 
sequent calculus LK, Girard [7, pp. 126, 129; 8, pp. 73, 741 points out two 
disadvantages of the former over the latter: (1) classical inferences are analysed in 
NK only as a special case of intuitionistic inferences either through a n- 
translation or by adding a special rule for negation which may be understood as 
stating that all sentences are decidable; (2) because of the form of (vE) and 
(3E), even for intuitionistic inferences the treatment of disjunction and exist- 
ential quantification is problematic: yet disjunction and existential quantification 
are the two most typically intuitionistic logical operations. Such defects make NK 
more unnatural than LK, in contrast with its name. 
This is implicitly acknowledged by Gentzen [6, pp. 79,821 when he states that, 
while the special rule for negation cannot be integrated in NK into the pattern of 
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introductions and eliminations, this characteristic is removed in LK; and when he 
agrees that (v E) and (3E) are somewhat artificial insofar as (v E) does not bring 
out the fact that it is only after the enunciation of q v w that we distinguish the 
cases Q, and W; similarly for (SE). Actually Gentzen claims that what is somewhat 
artificial is the tree form formulation of (vE) and (3E). But, since he does not 
seem to be willing to give up the tree form of derivations, his remark may be 
understood as a criticism of (vE) and (3E) outright. 
Commenting on the above defects, Prawitz [19, p. 44, footnote 21 agrees that 
treating classical logic only as a special case of intuitionistic logic is perhaps not 
the most natural way of analysing classical inferences. One may therefore 
consider modifying NK, and one natural modification is to make the system more 
symmetrical with respect to disjunction and existential quantification, as in the 
multiple conclusion natural deduction system of Kneale [13]. While this sugges- 
tion does not seem to have been taken over by Prawitz in later papers (see e.g. 
[20, pp. 244, 245]), his criticism largely agrees with Gentzen’s view. 
What is in question, however, is not so much naturalness as manageability: 
because of the above mentioned defects of NK, many standard classical laws have 
non-transparent indirect proofs in NK. By manageability we mean here ease in 
proof search and in proof checking, not the number of symbols or of proof 
lines- a rather crude complexity measure which seems to be relevant only in 
limit cases, not in the standard cases of actual logical practice. 
In [2] a sequent natural deduction system was introduced which does not 
present the above mentioned defects of NK. In that system classical inferences 
are analysed per se, independently of the intuitionistic ones. Similarly to BoriEiC 
[l], the system is intermediate between NK and LK: like in NK certain 
assumptions are made which may subsequently be discharged, and like in LK the 
inference rules involve finite sequences of formulas instead of single formulas. 
Differently from BoriEiE [l], however, the system includes an existential 
instantiation rule, in order both to avoid the above mentioned defects and to 
allow simpler proofs. The rules of universal generalization and existential 
instantiation are subject to restrictions of a kind similar to those of Quine [21], 
allowing greater freedom of operation than the restrictions of the corresponding 
rules (VI) and (3E) of NK. 
Criticizing systems including a form of existential instantiation, Lemmon [16] 
put forward the curious argument that classically valid but intuitionistically invalid 
sentences such as 3y (3x q,(x)-+ q(y)) ought to be hard to prove classically, but 
the argument seems to be unwarranted. Indeed all basic classical laws listed in 
Kalish et al. [9] have comparatively simple proofs in the system of [2]. 
However, just because of the liberality of the restrictions on the rules of 
universal generalization and existential instantiation, there are some problems in 
establishing a normalization theorem for the system of [2]. In view of this, in the 
present paper we introduce an alternative sequent natural deduction system NC,, 
of a kind similar to that of [2] but with more stringent restrictions on the rules. A 
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peculiar feature of NC, is that it involves restrictions on the discharge rules, like 
in the intuitionistic natural deduction systems of Smirnov [22; 231 and Leivant 
[15], or in the classical natural deduction systems of Kalish et al. [9], Belnap and 
Klenk [12] or Fine [4]. The statement of the new restrictions is made easier by 
introducing a variant of the e-terms. 
While less liberal than those of [2], the new restrictions allow to formulate 
reductions in terms of which a normalization theorem for NC, can be easily 
established, using a procedure similar to that of Prawitz [19]. Since the new 
restrictions allow less freedom of operation, NC, is not as manageable as the 
system of [2], but because of its other features it is more manageable than NK. 
A further advantage of NC, over NK consists in the wider scope of the 
normalization theorem for it. While, as shown by Prawitz [19], a normalization 
theorem can be easily established for a suitable variant C of NK, the 
corresponding normal form is a weak one: it does not satisfy the subformula 
property-except in the weak form of Prawitz [19, p. 42]- nor the separation 
property. On the other hand the normal form involved in the normalization 
theorem for NC, satisfies both properties, which allows to establish a version of 
the midsequent theorem and of Herbrand’s theorem for NC,. 
On that account one may question the (widespread) view that, while natural 
deduction may be useful when one wants a quick treatment, for a fully rigorous 
and complete treatment sequent calculus LK must be preferred (see e.g. 
Thomason [24]). NC, seems to be a good candidate for replacing not only NK (or 
rather, Prawitz’s variant C), but also LK in proof-theoretical investigations. 
1. The systems NC and NC, 
1.1. Languages 
The languages considered are first-order languages including both individual 
and function parameters. 
1.1.1. Definition. The symbols include: 
(i) individual variables no, x1, . . . ; 
(ii) individual parameters a,,, aI, . . . ; 
(iii) function parameters E@, cr, . . . ; 
(iv) individual constants kO, kr, . . . ; 
(v) n-ary function constants f;f, f 1, . . . (n 2 1); 
(vi) n-ary predicate constants P& P;, . . . (n 2 0); 
(vii) logical symbols 1, A, v , *, V, 3; 
(viii) auxiliary symbols ( , ), [ , ] and , (comma). 
1.1.2. Notation. We use x, y, z, . . . to denote individual variables, a, b, c, . . . to 
denote individual parameters, E, 5, q, . . . to denote function parameters, 
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k, I, m, . . . to denote individual constants, f, g, h, . . . to denote function con- 
stants, P, Q, R, . . . to denote predicate constants. 
1.1.3. Definition. Terms, e-terms, atomic formulas and formulas are defined 
inductively (simultaneously) as follows: 
(i) every individual parameter and individual constant is a term; 
(ii) if f is an n-ary function constant and tl, . . . , t, are terms, then 
fh * * . , tn) is a term; 
(iii) if P is an n-ary predicate constant and tl, . . . , t, are terms, then 
P(t1, . . . , t,) is an atomic formula and a formula (in particular, if P is a 0-ary 
predicate constant, then P is an atomic formula and a formula); 
(iv) if q and I# are formulas, then lq, (rp A r+!~), (rp v rj~) and ((p + I/J) are 
formulas; 
(v) if q(a) is a formula containing at least one occurrence of a, a is an 
individual parameter not occurring in any s-term in q(a) and x is an individual 
variable not occurring in q(a), then Vx (p(x) and 3x C&X) are formulas, where 
q(x) is an expression obtained from q(a) by replacing at least one occurrence of 
a byx; 
(vi) if E is a function parameter and (p is a formula of the form 3x q(x), then 
E[Q)] is a term and an s-term. 
1.1.4. Notation. We use t, u, v, . . . to denote terms, E, <, q, . . . to denote 
s-terms (in addition to function parameters), q, I$, x, . . . to denote formulas. 
1.1.5. Notation. We write ft, . . . t, for f(tl, . . . , t,), and Pt, . . . t,, for 
P(t1, . . . 9 cl). 
1.1.6. Definition. The degree of a formula q, written d(q), is the number of 
logical symbols occurring in q. 
1.1.7. Definition. (i) A term t or a formula Q, is closed if it contains no individual 
parameters. A closed formula is also called a sentence. 
(ii) A formula is quantifier-free if it contains no occurrence of the symbols V, 
3; a formula contains quantifiers if it is not quantifier-free. 
1.1.8. Notation. For any expression p, u, r we denote by p[g the result of 
replacing every occurrence of o in p by t, including occurrences in e-terms. 
1.1.9. Definition. The subformulas of a formula Q, are defined inductively as 
follows: 
(i) Q, is a subformula of q; 
(ii) if ‘I/J is a subformula of q, then so is q1; 
(iii) if (111 A 29, (W v X) or (W-x) is a subformula of q, then so are I/J and 2; 
(iv) if Vx q(x) or 3x rjj( x ) is a subformula of cp, then so is q[:] for each term t. 
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1.1.10. Definition. Occasionally we will consider expressions that are like terms 
or formulas except that they may contain individual variables at places where a 
term or formula has individual parameters. They will be called quasi-terms and 
quasi-formulas. We assume that the notations and notions concerning terms or 
formulas extend to quasi-terms and quasi-formulas. 
1.1.11. Definition. A sequent is a finite (possibly empty) sequence of formulas 
separated by commas. 
1.1.12. Notation. We use A, A, 0 to denote sequents. In particular, the empty 
sequent is denoted by 0. 
1.1.13. Remark. Intuitively a sequent A = cpl, . . . , P),, (where n > 0) has the 
same meaning as q1 v * * * v qn. The empty sequent 0 means that there is a 
contradiction. In what follows, however, we will not be concerned with the 
interpretation of sequents except as an intuitive guide to our understanding of the 
inference rules. 
1.1.14. Notation. The notation p[a of 1.1.8 extends also to sequents in the 
obvious way. 
1.1.15. Definition. A term t, a formula Q, or a sequent A is said to be e-free if it 
contains no c-terms. 
1.2. Inference rules and derivations 
The inference rules consist of structural rules and logical rules. The structural 
rules include weakening (W), contraction (C) and permutation (P). The logical 
rules include both propositional rules and quantifier rules. They consist of an 
introduction (I) rule and an elimination (E) rule for each logical symbol, except 
that in the case of 3 two alternative elimination rules are considered. The rules 
are indicated by the figures below. Formulas within square brackets indicate that 
the rule discharges assumptions as explained below. 
1.2.1. Definition. The inference rules are the following, where 
and 
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(1) Structural rules 
(W) & 
, 
4 q, Q, 
(Cl dg, 
, 
(2) Logical rules 
I-rules E-rules 
(AE) 
A,q,AV 
A Q, , “;;” 
9 
G’JS) 
A, 3.x ~4x1 
4 Q)(+ ~-4x)1) 
1.2.2. Definition. (i) In an inference the upper sequents are called the 
premisses, and the lower sequent is called the conclusion of that inference. 
(ii) In a (W) inference the formula cp is called the weakening formula of that 
inference. In a (C) inference the formula Q, is called the contraction formula. In a 
(P) inference the formulas Q, and q are called the permutation formulas. 
(iii) In an inference obtained by an I-rule the formula in the conclusion 
containing the logical symbol introduced is called the principal formula of that 
inference, while the formulas in the premisses from which the principal formula is 
built up are called the auxiliary formulas. [Note that in a (11) inference there are 
no auxiliary formulas.] 
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(iv) In an inference obtained by an E-rule the formula in the premiss 
containing the logical symbol eliminated is called the principal formula of that 
inference and the premiss in which it appears is called the major premiss. The 
other premiss (if any) is called the minor premiss. The formulas in the conclusion 
or in the minor premiss from which the principal formula is built up are called the 
auxiliary formulas. [Note that in a (1E) inference there are no auxiliary formulas 
in the conclusion.] 
(v) In an inference obtained by an arbitrary rule the formulas in A or r are 
called the side formulas of that inference. 
1.2.3. Definition. A derivation is a tree of sequents in which: 
(i) every topmost sequent, which is called an assumption of the derivation, 
consists of an arbitrary formula; 
(ii) every non-topmost sequent is yielded from the sequents standing immedi- 
ately above it by an inference obtained by one of the rules of 1.2.1, subject to 
certain restrictions to be stated below (see Section 1.3); 
(iii) the downmost sequent is called the conclusion of the derivation. 
1.2.4. Notation. We use 9, 8, 9, 3, . . . to denote derivations. 
1.2.5. Definition. (i) (*I), (11) and (3E) . f m erences allow assumptions of the 
form indicated within square brackets to be discharged. Discharge is not 
compulsory: any number of assumptions of the given form (possibly zero) may be 
discharged. 
(ii) A sequent A in a derivation 9 is said to depend on the assumptions 
standing above A in 9 which have not been discharged by some (+I), (11) or 
(3E) inference standing above A in 9. 
(iii) The open assumptions of a derivation 9 are the assumptions on which the 
conclusion of 9 depends. 
1.2.6. Notation. (i) We write [r] to indicate a (possibly empty) sequence of 
occurrences of a sequent r in a derivation. 
(ii) We write 
to indicate that the occurrences of v in [q] are open assumptions of 9. 
(iii) We write 
9 
A 
to indicate that A is the conclusion of 9 (so A is a part of 91 itself). 
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(iv) If rp is an assumption in a derivation 9, we write pth q to denote a finite 
sequence AI, . . . , A,, of sequents in 9 where AI is q, A, is the conclusion of 9, 
and each Ai, 16 i < n, stands immediately above Ai+l. 
(v) If Q, is an assumption in a derivation 9, we write 
to denote the tree of sequents obtained from 9 by replacing each sequent A in 
pth ~1 by A, A. 
(vi) Given two derivations 
we write 
to denote the tree of sequents obtained by writing g1 above each topmost 
sequent in 9z{pti”} which is in [A, (p]. 
(vii) We write 
to denote the tree of sequents obtained from a derivation 9 by replacing each 
sequent A in 9 by A[:]. 
1.3. Restrictions on parameters and presuppositions 
The inference rules (+I), (lI), (VI), (YE) and (3E,) are subject to certain 
restrictions. 
1.3.1. Definition. (i) In a (VI) or (3E) inference the individual parameter a is 
said to be the proper parameter of that inference. 
(ii) An individual parameter a is said to be a proper parameter of a derivation 
9 if it is the proper parameter of some (VI) or (3E) inference. 
1.3.2. Definition. The inference rules (VI) and (3E) are subject to the following 
restrictions on proper parameters: 
(i) In a (VI) . f m erence the proper parameter a must not occur in the conclusion 
of that inference or in any assumption on which the conclusion depends. 
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(ii) In an (3E) inference the proper parameter c1 must not occur in the major 
premiss, in the minor premiss or in any assumption on which the minor premiss 
depends except in the assumptions &a) discharged by that inference. 
1.3.3. Definition. Let NC be the system whose inference rules are those of 1.2.1 
except (3E,), subject to restrictions 1.3.2, where the rules are confined to c-free 
sequents (i.e., derivations in NC may contain only s-free sequents). 
1.3.4. Remark. NC is essentially the system of Boricic [l] except that in the 
latter (VI) is split into two inference rules: 
(“I’) 4 q *, w 
A,qvW’ *,vvW’ 
Using (v I) instead of (v I’) often allows more straightforward derivations. 
1.3.5. Remark. An intuitionistic version NJ of NC is obtained by introducing the 
restriction that in every (+I), (iI), (VI) ’ f m erence A must be empty (see [3]). 
1.3.6. Definition. (i) In an (3E,) inference the c-term E[~X 9$x)] is called the 
proper e-term of that inference. 
(ii) An E-term E is said to be a proper e-term of a derivation 9 if it is the 
proper s-term of some (3E,) inference in 9. 
1.3.7. Definition. We say that an e-term in a derivation 9 presupposes an 
assumption Q, if E is the proper E-term of an (3E,) inference whose premiss 
depends on q. 
1.3.8. Definition. The inference rules (+I) and (11) are subject to the following 
restrictions on discharge : 
(i) In an (+I) inference any c-term occurring in the principal formula q+ ‘1’ 
or in an assumption on which the conclusion A, q+ r+~ depends must not 
presuppose q. 
(ii) In a (11) inference any c-term occurring in the principal formula TQ, or in 
an assumption on which the conclusion A, 1~) depends must not presuppose 9~. 
1.3.9. Definition. We say that a subderivation Sa, of a derivation 9 introduces an 
s-term E in $S if 
is a subderivation of 5?J where E = E[~X q(x)] is the proper E-term of the indicated 
(3E,) inference. 
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1.3.10. Definition. The inference rule (3E,) is subject to the following restriction 
on proper e-terms: 
(*) If two subderivations ??& and & of a derivation 9 introduce the same 
c-term E in 9, then 6j& = ?Z& (i.e., 9, and & must be identical in shape). 
1.3.11. Remark. Restriction 1.3.10 can be liberalized replacing it by the follow- 
ing weaker one (see 2.2.7 below): 
(**) If two subderivations gdl and ?& of a derivation 9 introduce the same 
s-term E in 9, then gzil and & must have the same open assumptions and the 
same conclusion. 
1.3.12. Definition. (i) Let NC, be the system whose inference rules are those of 
1.2.1 except (3E), subject to restrictions 1.3.2, 1.3.8 and 1.3.10. 
(ii) Let NC: be the system whose inference rules are those of 1.2.1 (including 
both (3E) and (YE,)), subject to restrictions 1.3.2, 1.3.8 and 1.3.10. 
1.3.W. Remark. NC, and NC: are presuppositional systems in the sense of Fine 
[4]. The idea of a presuppositional system is implicit in the intuitionistic systems 
of Smirnov [22; 231 and Leivant [15] ( see also Mints [17] for an alternative 
approach), and in the classical systems of Montague and Kalish [18] (see also 
Kalish et al. [9]), Belnap and Klenk [12] and Fine [4]. 
1.3.14. Remark. The effect of restrictions on discharge 1.3.8 is shown by the 
following example. Let E = E[~X Rx]. Then the tree of sequents 
(1) 
3x Px 
WE) PE 
(+I) 
(31) 
3.x Px+= PC(l) 
3y (3x Px+ Py) 
is not a derivation in NC, or NC: because the principal formula 3x Px+ PE of 
the indicated (+I) inference contains an c-term E that presupposes the discharged 
assumption 3x Px. In NC, and NC: only the following more complicated 
derivation is available: 
(1) 
(W 
3x Px 
3x Px, Pa 
,,‘;;‘I) 3x Px, 3x Px + Pa 
(1) 
fd’J 3x Px, 3y (3x Px --, Py) 
(P) 
(=A 
3y (3x Px+ Py), 3x Px 
3V (3X PX+= Pi’). PE 
\a” 3y (3x Px+= Py), 3y (3x Px-+ Py) 
(C) 3y (3x Px+ Py) 
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1.3.15. Remark. Restrictions on discharge 1.3.8 and on proper c-terms 1.3.10 
(or 1.3.11 for that matter), while not necessary for the soundness of NC, in the 
semantical sense, are required for establishing the soundness of NC, relative to 
NC in the syntactical sense (see 2.2.4 below). 
1.3.16. Lemma. Every derivation 9 in NC, NC, or NC: can be transformed into 
a derivation 9’ with the same open assumptions and the same conclusion as 9, 
such that: 
(i) the proper parameter of a (VI) inference in 9 occurs only in sequents 
standing above the conclusion of that inference; 
(ii) the proper parameter of an (3E) inference in 9 occurs only in sequents 
standing above the minor premks of that inference; 
(iii) each proper parameter of 9 is the proper parameter of a single (VI) or (3E) 
inference. 
Proof. Similarly to Prawitz [19, p. 291. 0 
1.3.17. Definition. We say that a derivation 9 satisfies the proper parameter 
condition if it has the properties (i)-(iii) of 1.3.16. 
1.3.18. Convention. Using 1.3.16, in what follows we tacitly assume that all 
derivations considered satisfy the proper parameter condition. 
2. Relations between NC and NC, 
2.1. Idle parameters and e-terms 
In order to establish the results in the next section it is convenient to eliminate 
individual parameters and E-terms playing no essential role in a derivation. 
2.1.1. Definition. Let 9 be a derivation in NC, NC, or NC:, and let a be an 
individual parameter and E an E-term occurring in 9. 
(i) We say that a is idle in 9 if a is not a proper parameter of 9. 
(ii) We say that E is idle in 9 if E is not a proper s-term of 9. 
2.1.2. Definition. Let 5B be a derivation in NC, or NC:, and let E be an c-term 
occurring in 9. Then let: 
the set of all assumptions presupposed by E in 9, 
pra(E) = if E is a proper E-term of 9, 
0, otherwise. 
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2.1.3. Definition. Let 9 be a derivation in NC, or NC& let t be a term and let 
El, . . . , E,, (n 2 0) be the c-terms occurring in t. Then let: 
the set of all assumptions which are in pr9 ( ci) for some i, 
pr,(t)= lSiS)2, if n>O, 
0, if n = 0. 
2.1.4. Lemma. Let 9 be a derivation in NC, NC, or NC,f with open assumptions 
Zand conclusion A, let Y be an individual parameter or e-term idle in 9, and let t 
be a term containing no proper parameter of 9. 
(i) Zf t is e-free, then 9[‘;] is a derivation with open assumptions Z[J and 
conclusion A[ :I. 
(ii) Zf t is not E-free, then by abstaining from incorrect discharges in 9[ y] we 
obtain a derivation with open assumptions (Z, A)[:] and conclusion A[ :I, for some 
A G pr,(t). [Here abstaining from incorrect discharges in 9[ :] means: if some 
(+I) or (11) inference does not satisfy 1.3.8, we change it into one in which no 
assumptions are discharged.] 
Proof. By straightforward induction on the number of inferences of 9. 0 
2.1.5. Remark. If, in 2.1.4(i), Y does not occur in r or A, then Y can be 
eliminated from 9 by substituting an individual constant k for Y, without 
changing Tar A. 
2.2. Soundness of NC, relative to NC 
The soundness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense can be established 
by converting derivations in NC, into derivations in NC. 
2.2.1. Definition. A derivation 9 with open assumptions r and conclusion A is 
pure if all formulas in r or A are c-free. 
2.2.2. Theorem. Every pure derivation 9 in NC: can be transformed into a 
derivation 9’ in NC whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the 
same conclusion as 9. 
Proof. Using 2.1.5 we may assume that no c-term occurring in 9 is idle in 9. 
The proof is by induction on the number p of proper c-terms occurring in 9. 
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If p = 0, then the result is trivial because then 9 is a derivation in NC outright. 
If p = q + 1, then let E = E[~X r&x)] be a proper c-term of 9. By 1.3.10, 9 has 
the form: 
where all the conclusions of (3E,) inferences with proper s-term E are those 
indicated in square brackets. 
Let A be the uppermost sequent standing below [A, V(E)] such that E does not 
occur in A or in any assumption on which A depends. [Such a A must exist 
because 9 is pure.] Thus 9 is actually of the form: 
A, 3x Y(X) 
(3EE) [A, V(E)] 
Let % be the derivation in NC: with no open assumptions: 
GW 
where b and c are individual parameters not occurring in 9. Let a be an 
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individual parameter not occurring in 9, and let 9, be: 
r 
if? (3) 
(-+E) 
4 3~ v(x) 3x Q?(x)--+ V,(Q) 
[A, v(a)1 
53 %[:I 
W) 
3Y (3x W)-+ (P(Y)) A 
A 
(3) 
9 2 
We want to show that Bdl is a derivation in NC: whose open assumptions are 
among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. It suffices to note the 
following facts. 
(1) By 1.3.10, E is idle in 4, hence by 2.1.4(i) it can be seen that the tree 
ending with the minor premiss of the indicated (BE) inference is a derivation in 
NC:. [By the choice of A, E does not occur in A or in any assumption on which 
A depends in 9.1 
(2) The indicated (BE) inference satisfies 1.3.2(ii). For, by the choice of a, a 
does not occur in the major premiss. Since E does not occur in A, a does not 
occur in the minor premiss. Since E does not occur in any assumption on which A 
depends in 9, a does not occur in any assumption on which the minor premiss of 
the indicated (BE) inference depends in 9,, except 3x q(x)* ~(a). 
(3) Since, by the choice of A, sequents in 9, standing below A, Q)(E) either 
contain E or depend on assumptions containing E, by 1.3.8 no assumption in r 
may be discharged below A, Q)(E) in 9,. Therefore all discharges in 9 remain 
correct in 9J. 
Since obviously the number of proper e-terms in 9, is ~4, by the induction 
hypothesis 9, can be transformed into a derivation 9’ in NC whose open 
assumptions are among those of 9, and with the same conclusion as 9,. This 
yields the result. 0 
2.2.3. Remark. Our proof of 2.2.2 is similar to one of Leivant [15] (for a 
different system). The proof of Leivant [15] does not immediately extend to NC: 
because of the (different) form of our rule (BE). 
2.2.4. Corollary (Soundness theorem). Every pure derivation 9 in NC, can be 
transformed into u derivation 9’ in NC whose open assumptions are among those 
of 9 and with the same conclusion us 9. 
Proof. By 2.2.2 together with the fact that every derivation in NC, is a derivation 
in NC:. Cl 
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2.2.5. Remark. Since, by BoriEiC: [l], NC is sound, 2.2.4 establishes not only the 
soundness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense, but also the soundness 
of NC outright. 
2.2.6. Remark. Clearly 2.2.4 may be considered as a version of the second 
s-theorem for NC, (see e.g. Leisenring [14, p. 791). 
2.2.7. Remark. 2.2.2 (and hence 2.2.4) holds if the restriction 1.3.10 is replaced 
by the liberalized restriction 1.3.11. For, it can be easily shown that every 
derivation 9 satisfying 1.3.11 can be transformed into a derivation 9 satisfying 
1.3.10, with the same open assumptions and the same conclusion as 9. 
To establish this let gi, . . . , 9” (where n 2 2) be all subderivations of 9 
introducing the same c-term E in 9. Choose i, 1 <i 6 IZ, such that for no i, 
1 G i G n, i #i, 5$ is a subderivation of sjai. Replace every giai, 1 G i G IZ, i #i, in 9 
by 5?Jj. Clearly, by repeatedly applying this procedure for every c-term introduced 
in 9, we obtain a derivation 9 with the desired property. 
Note, however, that ?J and 9’ are only loosely related, 9’ being obtained from 
9 replacing subderivations by others which are only extensionally equivalent to 
them. 
2.3. Completeness of NC, relative to NC 
The completeness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense can be 
established by converting derivations in NC into derivations in NC,. 
2.3.1. Theorem. Every pure derivation 9 in NC: can be transformed into a pure 
derivation 9’ in NC, whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the 
same conclusion as 9. 
Proof. By induction on the number p of (3E) inferences in 9. 
If p = 0, then the result is trivial because 9 is a pure derivation in NC, 
outright. 
If p = q + 1, then take an (3E) inference in 9 such that no other (BE) 
inference in $?J stands above its major premiss. Thus 5?& is of the form: 
where 8 contains no (3E) inferences. 
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Let 0 be the open assumptions of 9 other than those in [q(a)]. [As shown in 
the figure, rare the open assumptions of 8.1 Let E = E[~X q(x)], and let 9r be: 
A, 3~ v,(x) 
(3EE) [A, Q)(E)] 
$[ I]( Pthp)} 
where we abstain from incorrect discharges (of some assumption in I’U 0) in 
ZF[:] (see 2.1.4(ii)). 
By 1.3.16(iii), a is not a proper parameter of 9, i.e., a is idle in 9, and by 
1.3.2(ii), a does not occur in A, hence by 2.1.4(ii), %[:I is a derivation in NC: 
whose open assumptions are either in (r U @)[“,I or in [Q)(E)], and whose 
conclusion is A. Now by 1.3.16(ii), u does not occur in r, and by 1.3.2(ii), a does 
not occur in 0, hence (I-U O)[(IE] = TU 0. Thus $;[:I is a derivation in NC: 
whose open assumptions are either in r U 0 or in [Q)(E)], and whose conclusion is 
A. 
Using this fact we may conclude that the assumptions on which A, A depends 
in 97r are in r U 0, hence they are among those on which the conclusion of (3E) 
depends in 9. Therefore ga, is a derivation in NC: whose open assumptions are 
among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. 
By the choice of (3E), the number of (3E) inferences in ?& is q, hence by the 
induction hypothesis Bdl can be transformed into a derivation 9’ in NC, whose 
open assumptions are among those of ga, and with the same conclusion as sa,. 
This yields the result. 0 
2.3.2. Corollary (Completeness theorem). Every derivation 9 in NC can be 
transformed into a pure derivation 9’ in NC, whose open assumptions are among 
those of 9 and with the same conclusion us 9. 
Proof. By 2.3.1 together with the fact that every derivation in NC is a pure 
derivation in NC:. 0 
2.3.3. Remark. Since, by BoriEiC [l], NC is complete, 2.3.2 establishes not only 
the completeness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense, but also the 
completeness of NC, outright. 
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3. Normalization in NC and NC, 
3.1. cuts 
In a derivation an inference obtained by (W) or by an I-rule, whose weakening 
formula or, respectively, principal formula is also the principal formula of an 
inference obtained by an E-rule standing below that inference, is an unnecessary 
detour. For historical reasons, such detours are called cuts. 
3.1.1. Remark. In order to simplify the proofs of the results below we consider 
an inessential variant NC- of NC. The variant is based on a device introduced by 
Kleene [IO; 11, p. 2901 which allows to drop the inference rule (P). The device is 
embodied in the following definition. 
3.1.2. Definition. We modify the inference rules of 1.2.1 by assuming that the 
order of listing of formulas within sequents is to be immaterial in applying the 
rules. 
3.1.3. Definition. Let NC- be the system whose inference rules are those of 
1.2.1 except (P) and (3E,), modified as indicated in 3.1.2 and subject to the 
restrictions 1.3.2, where the rules are confined to e-free sequents. 
3.1.4. Theorem. Every derivation 9 in NC can be transformed into a derivation 
$3’ in NC- with the same open assumptions and the same conclusion as 9; and 
vice versa. 
Proof. Clear. •! 
3.1.5. Definition. A (W) inference is said to be atomic if its weakening formula is 
atomic. 
3.1.6. Definition. A cut in a derivation 9 (in any of the systems considered in 
this paper) is a sequence 2 = A,, . . . , A, of sequents in 5B such that there is a 
formula q~, called its cut formula, satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) Q, is a member of each Ai, 1 s i =S n; 
(ii) AI is the conclusion of a non-atomic (W) inference whose weakening 
formula is rp, or of an inference obtained by an I-rule whose principal formula is 
V; 
(iii) each Ai, 1 S i <n, is a premiss of an inference, whose conclusion is Ai+,; 
(iv) A,, is the major premiss of an inference obtained by an E-rule, whose 
principal formula is ‘p. 
3.1.7. Remark. In a sense (W) is not a proper structural rule because, like the 
I-rules, it generally allows to introduce new logical symbols. This accounts for the 
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above definition of cut. On the other hand, the special case of (W) when it>, 
weakening formula is atomic may be considered as a proper structural rule. 
3.1.8. Definition. The length of a cut _?Z = Al, . . . , A, is n; the degree of a cut .Z 
is the degree of q, d(q), where Q, is the cut formula of 2. 
3.1.9. Definition. A derivation SB is said to be cut-free, or normal, if 9 contains 
no cuts. 
3.2. Reductions 
In order to eliminate cuts from a derivation we introduce transformation steps 
of three kinds, called weakening reductions, logical reductions and permutative 
reductions. 
3.2.1. Definition. Cuts of length 1, consisting of a (W) inference whose 
weakening formula is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an E-rule 
standing immediately below it, can be eliminated by the following transforma- 
tions, called weakening reductions : 
WA -reduction 
W v -reduction 
(W A 
(VE) 
A,q,v+ 
- A, 47, v 
W+-reduction 
H 
Wl-reduction 
H 
(W) inferences 
(W) inferences 
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WV-reduction 
91 
(W) A 
(VE) 
4 Vx q(x) 
4 v(t) H 
WSreduction 
% [da)1 % 
w A ; A 
FE) 
A, 34~) H (W) inferences 
A n 
1 4 A 
3.2.2. Definition. Cuts of length 1, consisting of an inference obtained by an 
I-rule whose principal formula is also the principal formula of an inference 
obtained by an E-rule standing immediately below it, can be eliminated by the 
following transformations, called logical reductions : 
A -reduction 
9; 
A;, Vi 
H 
(W) inferences (i = I 2) 
Ai, A29 Vi 
, 
v-reduction 
(VI) 
4~ ‘1’ 
(vE) 
4vv+ gd, 
* 4 v, v 4 ~9 v 
+-reduction 
l-3 
9 Pth Q, 
2 
1 I A 
92 
4 v 
(W) inferences 
4 4 @ 
if [VI f 0, 
if [q] = 0. 
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l-reduction 
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H 
9 
if [ql #0, 
b-3 (W) inferences if [q] = 0. 
4 A 
V-reduction 
g-reduction 
b(a)1 
(31) 
4 v(t) 92 
(9 
4 3.x q(x) A 
H 
A n 
, 
H 
91 
4 v(t) 
B2[ y]{ PthI(f)) if [q,(a)] # 0, 
A, A 
92 
A 
(W) inferences 
4 A 
if [q(a)] = 0. 
3.2.3. Definition. Every inference q obtained by an arbitrary rule can be 
permuted with an inference 6 obtained by an E-rule standing immediately below 
it provided that the principal formula of 6 is a side formula of q, by 
transformations called per-mutative reductions. For brevity we illustrate only the 
case when q is a (VI) inference, leaving the remaining cases to the reader. 
VI A -permutative reduction 
OfI) 
4 x(a), VI A 4)~ 
(4 
4 x(a), VI* 4)~ 
(AE) 
4 V_x x(x), vl* 4)~ 
H 
(VU 
4 x(a), vi 
A, VTX X(X), Vi A, V_X X(X), Vi 
(i = 1, 2) 
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VI v -permutative reduction 
91 
(VI) 
A, x(a), (P v w 
(vE) 
A, V_x x(x), Q, v q~ 
A, Vxx(x), ~2 ‘1’ 
VI+-permutative reduction 
% (VI) fk x(a), q+ w 
(+E)” ’ 
A, VXX(X)> 47--,? 
(-+E) ” Q’ A> x(a)7 (P* w 
H 
(VI) 
A, A, x(a)> 3 
A, A, VXX(X), ~JJ A, A, V_x x(x)> rk 
VIl-permutative reduction 
% (VI) A> x(a)> TQ, 
(1E) ” ’ 
A, V_x x(x), TQ, 
A, A, Vxx(x) 
VIV-permutative reduction 
(vI) 4 x(u), VY T(Y) 
(VE) A, vxx(x), VY V(Y) 
(VE) 4 X(U), VY q,(y) 
H 
OfI) 
4 x(a)> v,(t) 
A, V.IY x(x), A, vxx(x), ~(4 
VISpermutative reduction 
97(t) 
[CP(b)l 
[Q?(b)1 
% 92 
(vI) 4 z&h 3Y V,(Y) % 
(3E~ 4 “xx(x)t 3~ Q~Y) A 
(3E) 4 x(a), 3~ V,(Y) A 
H PI) 
A, A x(a) 
A, A, vxx(x) A, A vir x(x) 
3.2.4. Remark. The use of permutative reductions is twofold: (1) to reduce the 
length of cuts; (2) to move inferences obtained by an E-rule up as far as possible 
to prevent the generation of new cuts. 
3.2.5. Remark. In accordance with 1.3.18, we assume that the result of applying 
one of these transformations is a derivation satisfying the proper parameter 
condition, if necessary by an application of 1.3.16. 
3.3. Normalization 
Applying the reductions of Section 3.2 in an appropriate way one can eliminate 
all cuts from any derivation in NC- or NC and from any pure derivation in NC,. 
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3.3.1. Theorem (Normalization theorem for NC-). Every derivation 9 in NC- 
can be transformed into a normal derivation 6%’ in NC- whose open assumptions 
are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 53. 
Proof. By the degree of a derivation we mean the maximum degree of its cuts or 
0 if the derivation is normal. By the index of a derivation we mean the number of 
cuts of maximum degree within the derivation or 0 if the derivation is normal. 
The order of a derivation is defined as the pair (d, i) where d is the degree and i is 
the index of the derivation. 
The proof is by induction on the order (d, i) of 9, where orders are supposed 
to be ordered lexicographically, i.e., (d, i) is less than (d’, i’) if either d < d’ or 
d=d’ and i<i’. 
First, using the permutative reductions 3.2.3, we move inferences obtained by 
E-rules up as far as possible preserving their order of application, thus 
transforming 9 into a derivation 9,. Clearly 9, has the same order as 9. [This 
follows by inspection of permutative reductions.] 
Then we choose a cut in 9, of degree d such that no cut of degree d occurs 
above it in 9,, and which is also such that the inference of which the last sequent 
in the cut is the major premiss does not have as a minor premiss a sequent which 
belongs to or stands below another cut of degree d. 
Because inferences obtained by E-rules have been moved up as far as possible 
in 9,, the chosen cut has length 1. Apply the appropriate weakening reduction 
3.2.1 or logical reduction 3.2.2 to the cut in question, thus transforming 9, into a 
derivation &,. Clearly 9Z has order less than the order of 9,. [This follows by 
inspection of weakening and logical reductions. Note that, since inferences 
obtained by E-rules have been moved up as far as possible in 9,, the new (W) 
inferences introduced in some weakening and logical reductions to restore side 
formulas do not generate new cuts.] Then apply the induction hypothesis to 
transform 9* into a normal derivation 9’. 0 
3.3.2. Corollary (Normalization theorem for NC). Every derivation 9 in NC can 
be transformed into a normal derivation 9’ in NC whose open assumptions are 
among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. 
Proof. By 3.3.1 together with 3.1.4. Cl 
3.3.3. Remark. The cut elimination theorem for NC is established in BoriEic [l] 
using the natural mapping from derivations in LK to derivations in NC together 
with Gentzen’s [6] cut elimination theorem for LK. The normalization theorem 
for NC is stated in BoriEiC [l] without mentioning the reductions involved. 
3.3.4. Remark. Not all derivations in NC, can be transformed into normal 
derivations, a counterexample being provided by the following derivation, where 
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& = &[3X Px]: 
(1) 
(31) Pt 
3x Px 
WJ PE 
However, the result holds if we confine ourselves to pure derivations, as shown 
by the following result. 
3.3.5. Theorem (Normalization theorem for NC,). Every pure derivation 9 in 
NC, can be transformed into a normal derivation 9’ in NC, whose open 
assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. 
Proof. By 2.2.4, 9 can be transformed into a derivation 9, in NC whose open 
assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. By 3.3.2, 
LSa, can be transformed into a normal derivation 9; in NC whose open 
assumptions are among those of 9i and with the same conclusion as 9,. By 2.3.2, 
9~; can be transformed into a derivation 9’ in NC, whose open assumptions are 
among those of 9; and with the same conclusion as 9i;. By inspection of the 
proof of 2.3.2 it appears that, since 9d; is normal, such is 9’. This yields the 
result. 0 
4. The structure of normal derivations of NC, 
4.1. The form of tracks 
A pure normal derivation in NC, has a special structure: the assumptions, or 
weakening formulas, or principal formulas of (11) inferences, are broken down in 
their components by use of the E-rules, and the final components thus obtained 
are then put together by use of the I-rules. To state this structure in a more 
precise way we introduce some notions. 
4.1.1. Definition. If p is a formula occurring in a premiss of an inference, then 
the successors of p are defined as follows: 
(i) if p is one of the two occurrences of the contraction formula in the premiss 
of a (C) inference, then the occurrence of the contraction formula in the 
conclusion is a successor of p; 
(ii) if p is an occurrence of a permutation formula in the premiss of a (P) 
inference, then the occurrence of the permutation formula in the conclusion is a 
successor of p; 
(iii) if p is an auxiliary formula in a premiss of an inference obtained by an 
I-rule, then the principal formula in the conclusion is a successor of p; 
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(iv) if p is the principal formula in the major premiss of an inference obtained 
by an E-rule, then an auxiliary formula in the conclusion is a successor of p; 
(v) if p is the nth formula of A (respectively, A) in a premiss of an inference 
obtained by any rule, then the nth formula of A (respectively, A) in the 
conclusion is a successor of p. 
4.1.2. Definition. A track of a derivation 9 is a sequence Z = q,, . . . , tpn of 
formulas such that: 
(i) q1 is an assumption, or a weakening formula, or the principal formula of a 
(11) inference; 
(ii) qi+i for 1 C i < n is a successor of vi; 
(iii) 97, is either: 
(a) the auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (+E) or (1E) inference, 
or 
(b) the principal formula of a (1E) inference, or 
(c) a formula belonging to the conclusion of 9, 
whatever of the conditions (a)-(c) applies first. 
If cp, satisfies condition (iii)(c), then .Z is said to be an end track of 9. 
4.1.3. Examples. (1) The derivation: 
contains three tracks consisting respectively of: (i) the formulas P v Q, Q, Q, Q, 
lP+- Q, (P v Q)+ (-P* Q); (ii) the formulas P v Q, P, P; (iii) the formula 
TP. 
(2) The derivation: 
(1) (2) 
(1E) ’ lp 
(3 
(+I) 
52) 
P_,-nP(l) 
contains three tracks consisting respectively of: (i) the formulas -P, P--,-nP; 
(ii) the formula P; (iii) the formula 1P. 
Existential instantiation and normalization 
(3) The derivation: 
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(11) j+&) 7;: Q (3) 
(+E) 
(+) “’ p lQ 
contains four tracks consisting respectively of: (i) the formulas P, P, P, P, 
TQ + P, (lP+ Q)+ (1Q + P); (ii) the formula 1P; (iii) the formulas lP+- Q, 
Q; (iv) the formula 1Q. 
4.1.4. Definition. (i) A segment of a track Z is a sequence o of consecutive 
formulas in 2 that are identical, i.e., are occurrences of the same formula. 
(ii) If a segment (J consists of occurrences of the formula 47, we say that Q, is 
the formula of CT. 
4.1.5. Definition. Every track 2 can be uniquely divided into consecutive 
segments crl, . . . , ok. The sequence ul, . . . , ok iS called the sequence Of segments 
in 2. 
4.1.6. Remark. Since segments 
may transfer some terminology 
definition. 
consist of occurrences of the same formula, we 
from formulas to segments as in the following 
4.1.7. Definition. (i) We say that a segment is an assumption if the first formula 
of the segment is an assumption. 
(ii) We say that a segment is a weakening formula if the first formula of the 
segment is a weakening formula. 
(iii) We say that a segment is the principal formula of an inference obtained by 
an I-rule if the first formula of the segment is the principal formula of that 
inference. We say that a segment is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained 
by an I-rule if the last formula of the segment is an auxiliary formula of that 
inference. 
(iv) We say that a segment is the principal formula of an inference obtained by 
an E-rule if the last formula of the segment is the principal formula of that 
inference. We say that a segment is an auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of 
an inference obtained by an E-rule if the last formula of the segment is dn 
auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of that inference; an auxiliary formula in 
the conclusion if the first formula of the segment is an auxiliary formula in the 
conclusion of that inference. 
136 C. Cellucci 
(v) We say that a segment o is a subformula of a segment o’ if the formula of 
o is a subformula of the formula of a’. 
(vi) We say that a segment u is quantifier-free if the formula of o is 
quantifier-free. 
4.1.8. Definition. A cut segment of a track .X is a segment of 2 that begins with 
the weakening formula of a non-atomic (W) inference or the principal formula of 
an inference obtained by an I-rule and ends with the principal formula of an 
inference obtained by an E-rule. 
4.1.9. Remark. Clearly the notion of cut segment is strictly related to that of cut: 
each cut determines a cut segment, and vice versa. Thus a derivation is normal if 
and only if it contains no cut segments. 
4.1.10. Theorem (Form of tracks). Let ‘3 be a pure normal derivation in NC,. 
Letzbeatrackin 9andleta,,..., a,, be the sequence of segments in 2. Then 
there is a segment o, in 22, called the minimum segment of 2, which separates two 
(possibly empty) parts of 2, called the E-part (elimination part) and the I-part 
(introduction part) of 2, such that: 
(i) for each ui in the E-part (i.e. j <i) it holds that oi is the principal formula 
of an inference obtained by an E-rule and ai+, is a subformula of oi; 
(ii) ai, for i #n, is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule; 
(iii) for each uj in the I-part (i.e. i <j) it holds that, for j # n, uj is an auxiliary 
formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule and is a subformula of u,+, . 
Proof. First we show that in 2 each segment that is the principal formula of an 
inference obtained by an E-rule precedes each segment that is an auxiliary 
formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule. Suppose not. Then in Z there is a 
first segment which is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an E-rule 
and succeeds a segment which is the principal formula of an inference obtained by 
an I-rule, and such a segment is a cut segment. This contradicts the hypothesis 
that 53 is normal. 
Now, let ui be the first segment in _Z that is an auxiliary formula of an inference 
obtained by an I-rule or, if there is no such segment, let ui = a,,. Then clearly ai 
satisfies (i) and (ii). By what has been proved every segment Uj such that i <j, for 
j #n, is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule, hence (iii) is 
satisfied. This concludes the proof. 0 
4.2. The subformula property 
From the detailed description of the form of tracks of pure normal derivations 
of NC, we may conclude that each formula occurring in such a derivation is a 
subformula of an open assumption or of a formula in the conclusion. This can be 
established as follows. 
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4.2.1. Definition. We assign an order to every track .X = vi, . . . , Q?,, of a pure 
normal derivation 9 as follows: 
(i) if 97, occurs in the conclusion of 9, then .Z is of order 0; 
(ii) if Q),, is the auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (+E) or (1E) 
inference and the principal formula in the major premiss of that inference belongs 
to a track of order p, then Z is of order p + 1. 
(iii) if Q)~ is the principal formula of a (YE) inference, then ,Z is of order 0 
whenever q1 is an open assumption of 9, while _Z is of order p + 1 whenever 9, 
is an assumption discharged in 9 by an (-I) or (11) inference whose principal 
formula belongs to a track of order p. 
4.2.2. Remark. If Z’= ql, . . . , tpn is a track of a pure normal derivation and q,, 
is the principal formula of a (1E) inference, then v, cannot be a weakening 
formula or the principal formula of a (11) inference, hence q1 must be an 
assumption. This motivates 4.2.l(iii). 
4.2.3. Example. In the derivation (1) of 4.1.3 the track under (i) is of order 0, 
the track under (iii) is of order 1 and the track under (ii) is of order 2. In the 
derivation (2) of 4.1.3 the track under (i) is of order 0, the track under (iii) is of 
order 1 and the track under (ii) is of order 2. In the derivation (3) of 4.1.3 the 
track under (i) is of order 0, the track under (iv) is of order 1, the track under (iii) 
is of order 2 and the track under (ii) is of order 3. 
4.2.4. Theorem (Subformula property). Let 9 be a pure normal derivation in 
NC, with open assumptions I’ and conclusion A. Then each formula in 9 is a 
subformula of some formula in Tar in A. 
Proof. Let 9 be a pure normal derivation in NC, with open assumptions r and 
conclusion A. We assume that the result holds for all segments of a track of order 
<p and show that it holds also for all segments of a track of order p. Let .Z be a 
track of 9 of order p, let cr,, . . . , CJ, be the sequence of segments in _X and let cri 
be the minimum segment of 2. 
First we show that the result holds for a,,. If a, occurs in A, then the result is 
clear. If a, is the auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (-+E) or (1E) 
inference, then a,, is a subformula of the principal formula in the major premiss 
and the latter belongs to a path of order p - 1, hence the result holds for a, by 
hypothesis. If o,, is the principal formula of a (1E) inference, then by 4.1.10, u1 is 
an assumption and a,, is a subformula of o,. If o, is in r, then the result holds for 
a,,. If g1 is discharged by an (+I) or (11) inference, then o, is a subformula of 
the principal formula of that inference which belongs to a track of order p - 1, so 
the result holds for o1 by hypothesis, and hence it holds for a,. Since the result 
holds for a,, by 4.1.10 it holds for all oj with i <j < n. 
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Next we show that the result holds for ol. If o1 is in r, then the result is clear. 
If o1 is an assumption discharged by an (+I) or (11) inference, then or is a 
subformula of the principal formula of that inference which belongs either (1) to 
the I-part of 2, or (2) to a track of order <p. In case (l), the result holds for ui 
by what we have already established for Oj with i <j s n. In case (2), it holds by 
hypothesis. If ur is a weakening formula or the principal formula of a (11) 
inference, then, since 9 is normal, o1 cannot belong to the E-part of _Z:, hence o1 
is either the minimum segment or belongs to the I-part of Z. In both cases the 
result holds for u1 by what we have already established for a, with i <j s n. Then 
by 4.1.10 the result holds for all aj with j =S i. This concludes the proof. 0 
4.2.5. Corollary (Separation property). Let 9 be a pure normal derivation in 
NC, with open assumptions r and conclusion A. Then 9 contains only inferences 
obtained by structural rules or by logical rules for the logical symbols occurring in 
Tar A. 
Proof. Immediate from 4.2.4 by inspection of the inference rules. 0 
4.3. Permutability 
Pure normal derivations in NC, with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is 
a sequent consisting of prenex formulas only, can be uniformly transformed into 
pure normal derivations with no open assumptions and with the same conclusion, 
having an even more transparent structure. The transformation consists essentially 
in the permutation of certain inferences. 
4.3.1. Definition. (i) A prenex formula is a formula of the form 
Q,x, . * * Qp, I/+~, . . . , x,) where n 2 0, each Qi is an occurrence of V or 3, and 
the quasi-formula $~(xi, . . . , x,) is quantifier-free. 
(ii) An existential formula is a prenex formula Qrx, . . * Q,x, ~(x,, . . . , x,) 
where each Qi is an occurrence of 3. 
4.3.2. Theorem. Let 9 be a pure normal derivation 9 in NC, with no open 
assumptions whose conclusion is a sequent A consisting of prenex formulas only. 
Let_Zbeatrackin9,1etaI,..., a,, be the sequence of segments in 2 and let oi be 
the minimum segment of _Z. Then the following conditions hold: 
(i) every oj in the E-part of 2 (i.e. j < i) is quantifier-free; 
(ii) either 
(a) ai and every oj in the I-part of 2 (i.e. i <j) is quantifier-free; or 
(b) a,, is in A (so 2 in an end track in 9) and either u, is quantifier free or, if 
u, is not quantifier-free, then u1 is a weakening formula. 
Proof. If ur is a weakening formula or the principal formula of a (11) inference, 
then ui = ai since 9 is normal, hence (i) holds vacuously. If u1 is an assumption, 
Exbtential instantiation and normalization 139 
then u1 must have been discharged in 9 by an (*I) or (11) inference whose 
conclusion is of the form q+x or iv respectively, where r/.~ is the formula of o,. 
By 4.2.4, q-x or lrj~ is a subformula of a formula in A and hence must be 
quantifier-free. Thus I/J and hence o, must be quantifier-free. Therefore, by 
4.1.10, condition (i) holds. 
If a,, is in A, then the first half of (ii)(b) holds. If oi is quantifier-free, then the 
second half of (ii)(b) holds. If o1 is not quantifier-free, then by the above 
argument o1 cannot be an assumption, and by 4.2.4, cri cannot be the principal 
formula of a (11) inference, so o1 must be a weakening formula, hence the 
second half of (ii)(b) holds. If a,, is an auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of 
an (+E) or (1E) inference, then the principal formula of that inference is of the 
form q+x or 13 respectively, where 3 is the formula of a,. By 4.2.4, q+= x or 
~IJJ is a subformula of a formula in A and hence must be quantifier-free. Thus $I 
and hence a,, must be quantifier-free. Then, by 4.1.10, ai and every oj in the 
I-part of ,Y must be quantifier-free, hence (ii)(a) holds. If CJ, is the principal 
formula of a (1E) inference, then the formula of a,, is of the form 1~. By 4.2.4, 
1~ is a subformula of a formula in A and hence must be quantifier-free. Thus a,, 
must be quantifier-free. Then, by 4.1.10, a, and every oi in the I-part of _Z must 
be quantifier-free, hence (ii)(a) holds. 0 
4.3.3. Remark. By 4.3.2 the only inferences in 9 obtained by quantifier rules are 
(VI) or (31) ’ f m erences whose auxiliary and principal formulas occur in the I-part 
of some end tracks of 9, and the only formulas occurring in 9 which contain 
quantifiers but are not principal formulas of (VI) or (31) inferences are weakening 
formulas. 
4.3.4. Theorem. Every pure normal derivation 9 in NC, with no open assump- 
tions whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of prenex formulas only can be 
transformed into a pure normal derivation 9’ in NC, with no open assumptions 
and with the same conclusion as 9, such that all weakening formulas in $3’ are 
quantifier-free. 
Proof. Let r,~ be a (W) inference in 9 whose weakening formula contains 
quantifiers. By 4.2.4 such a weakening formula must be a subformula of some 
formula in the conclusion of 9, say 0,x, * * * Q,x, I&~, . . . , x,). Hence the 
conclusion of rl must be of the form A, Q,xi * . . Qnx, q(uI, . . . , u~_.~, 
Xi, . . . ) X,). 
We modify 9 as follows. Let bi, . . . , b, be new individual parameters not 
occurring in 9 and let ui, . . . , u;_~ be the result of replacing every occurrence of 
xi, . . . , n, by bi, . . . , b, in u,, . . . , Ui--l, respectively. We replace the conclusion 
of rl by the sequent A, I+(u;, . . . , u:_~, bi, . . . , b,), so that rl is transformed into 
a (W) inference whose weakening formula is quantifier-free. Then we add a 
number of (VI) or (31) inferences below A, $J(u~, . . . , u:-~, bi, . . . , b,), so as to . 
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obtain again 
A, Qix;. . * Q~x, I#(u~, . . s 9 Ui_1, Xi, . . s j x,). 
Repeating the procedure for each (W) inference in 9 whose weakening 
formula contains quantifiers we ultimately obtain a derivation 9’ with the desired 
properties. q 
4.3.5. Remark. To appreciate the improvement over 4.3.2 allowed by 4.3.4 note 
that, if 9 is a pure normal derivation in NC, with no open assumptions whose 
conclusion A consists of prenex formulas only, such that all weakening formulas 
in 9 are quantifier-free, and if 2 is a track in 9, CJ,, . . . , a, is the sequence of 
segments in Z and ai is the minimum segment of 2, then by 4.3.2 the following 
conditions hold: 
(i) every uj in the E-part of 2 (i.e. j < i) is quantifier-free; 
(ii) oi is quantifier-free; 
(iii) either 
(a) every Uj in the I-part of _Z’ (i.e. i <j) is quantifier-free; or 
(b) a, is in A (so Z is an end track in 9). 
4.3.6. Theorem (Permutability theorem). Every pure normal derivation 9 in 
NC, with no open assumptions whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of prenex 
formulas only can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9 with no open 
assumptions and with the same conclusion as 9, such that each propositional and 
(W) inference in 9’ stands above every (VI) or (31) f m erence [the latter being the 
only quantifier inferences which may occur in 9’1. Moreover, if all weakening 
formulas in 9 are quantifier-free, then so are all weakening formulas in 9’. 
Proof. By 4.3.3 the only inferences in 9 obtained by quantifier rules are (VI) or 
(31) inferences. Let m(9) be the total number of pairs (11, 6) such that r] is a 
(VI) or (31) . f m erence and I? is a propositional inference standing (not necessarily 
immediately) below r] in 9. Similarly, let n(9) be the total number of pairs 
(q, 6) such that 7 is a (VI) or (31) inference and 6 is a (W) inference standing 
(not necessarily immediately) below 77 in 9. The proof is by induction on the pair 
(m(g), n(g)), h w ere all such pairs are supposed to be ordered lexicographically. 
Case 1: m(9) = 0 and n(9) = 0. Then all propositional and (W) inferences 
stand in 9 above all (VI) and (31) inferences, hence the result is trivial. 
Case 2: m(9) > 0. Then there is a (VI) or (31) inference, say r], which stands 
above a propositional inference. Let 6 be the topmost propositional inference 
below n, so that all inferences intermediate between q and 19 (if any) are 
structural. By 4.2.4 the auxiliary formulas of 19 must be quantifier-free, hence the 
principal formula of 77 cannot be an auxiliary formula of 6. This allows to 
permute q and 6 yielding a new derivation 9i such that m(9,) = m(9) - 1. The 
result then follows by applying the induction hypothesis to 9,. 
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In order to show the permutability of 71 and 6 we must distinguish a number of 
cases. For illustration we consider the case where q is a (VI) inference and 19 is an 
(+I) inference. Then 9 is of the form: 
Without loss of generality we may assume that the inferences intermediate 
between q and 6 do not include any (C) inference whose contraction formula is 
Vxx(x). [For, such a (C) inference can be always moved below 6, because 6 
already contains Vx x(x) as a side formula, and all inference rules are such that, 
if an inference contains a given side formula, it remains a correct inference if any 
number of repetitions of that side formula is added.] Then let LB1 be the 
derivation: 
(1) 
[VI 
81 
@> x(a) 
(W), (C), (P) inferences 
(-+I) 
4, x(a), A27 VJ 
4, x(a), A2, Q)+ 14 
(1) 
(P) inferences 
tvIj 4, A27 cp+ v, x(a) 
4, A2, v+ VJ, V.x x(x) 
(P) inferences 
4, V_x x(x), A27 v+ V 
82 
[Note that the restriction on proper parameters 1.3.2(i) is satisfied by the 
indicated (VI) inference because of our assumption 1.3.18.1 
Case 3: m(9) = 0 and n(9) > 0. Then there is a (VI) or (31) inference, say q, 
which stands above a (W) inference. Let 6 be the topmost (W) inference below 
q, so that all inferences intermediate between q and 6 (if any) are (P) or (C) 
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inferences. In order to establish the result we need only show: 
ct> Every (VI), (31), (P) or (C) inference p can be permuted with a (W) 
inference Y standing immediately below it (i.e., such that the conclusion 
of the former is the premiss of the latter). 
For, using (t), 6 can be moved up until q and 6 are permuted, yielding a new 
derivation 9i such that m(9&) = 0 and n(9J = n(9) - 1. The result then follows 
by applying the induction hypothesis to 94. 
It remains to establish (7). For illustration we consider two cases. If ~1 is a (VI) 
inference, then the given derivation is of the form: 
The permutation is performed as follows: 
[Note that the restriction on proper parameters 1.3.2(i) is satisfied by the 
indicated (VI) inference because of our assumption 1.3.18.1 If ~1 is a (C) 
inference, then the given derivation is of the form: 
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The permutation is performed as follows: 
(P) inferences 
(C) 
0, 97, x, x 
Q, q, x 
(P) ___ 
6% x, q 
82 0 
4.3.7. Theorem (Midsequent theorem). Every pure normal derivation 9 in NC, 
with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of prenex 
formulas only, can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9’ with no open 
assumptions and with the same conclusion as 9, in which there is a sequent 0, 
called the midsequent of 9’, such that: 
(i) 0 consists of quantifier-free formulas only; 
(ii) every inference standing above 0 in 9’ is a propositional or a structural 
inference; 
(iii) every inference standing below 0 in 9’ is a (VI), (31), (C) or (P) inference. 
Proof. By 4.3.4 and 4.3.6, 9 can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 
9’ with no open assumptions and with the same conclusion as 9, in which all 
weakening formulas are quantifier-free and all propositional and (W) inferences 
stand above all (VI) or (31) inferences. Let 0 be the premiss of the topmost (VI) 
or (31) inference in 9’ (if any); otherwise, let 0 be the conclusion of 9’. By 
4.3.3 the only formulas containing quantifiers occurring in 0 or above 0 would 
be weakening formulas. Since all weakening formulas in 9’ are quantifier-free, it 
follows that 0 must be quantifier-free. 0 
4.4. Uniformity results 
The more transparent structure provided by the midsequent theorem has a 
number of interesting applications. In this section we discuss two such applica- 
tions, showing that pure normal derivations in NC, with no open assumptions, 
whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of prenex sentences only, can be 
transformed into pure normal derivations with no open assumptions, whose 
conclusion is a sequent consisting of quantifier free sentences only. 
4.4.1. Convention. In this section we assume that the language considered 
contains at least one individual constant, say k,. 
4.4.2. Theorem (First uniformity theorem). Every pure normal derivation 9 in 
NC, with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent A consisting of 
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existential sentences only, can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9’ 
with no open assumptions whose conclusion is a sequent A’ consisting of 
quantifier-free sentences only, such that every inference in 9’ is a propositional or 
a structural inference. 
Specifically, A’ contains a number of quantifier-free sentences of the form 
q(ti, . . . , t;), . . . , +(ty, . . . , tf) for each existential sentence 3x, - . . 
%I $(x1, . * * f x,) in A. [Here ti, . . . , tl, for 1 =G i up, are closed terms built up 
from the individual and function constants occurring in 9, and from k, .] 
Proof. By 4.3.7, 9 can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9, with no 
open assumptions and conclusion A and with midsequent O1. Every formula in 
Oi is of the form rJ~(ui, . . . , ui), for some existential sentence 
3x* * * * 3X” +(x1, . . . 3 x,) in A and some terms u’,, . . . , uf,, because all in- 
ferences intervening between Oi and the conclusion A are (II), (C) or (P) 
inferences. Let %i be the part of 9, ending with 0,. If 0, contains individual 
parameters or c-terms, replace all such individual parameters or s-terms in 8i by 
the individual constant kI (see 2.1.5). Thus 8, is transformed into a tree of 
sequents $$ which is still a derivation because 8, contains inferences obtained by 
propositional and structural rules only. If we put 9’ = &, then clearly 9’ has the 
desired properties. Cl 
4.4.3. Remark. The converse of 4.4.2 also holds: Every pure normal derivation 
9 in NC, with no open assumptions whose conclusion is a sequent A consisting of 
quantifier-free sentences only, can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 
9’ with no open assumptions whose conclusion is a sequent A’ consisting of 
existential sentences only. 
Specifically, A’ contains an existential sentence 3x, * . . 3x, q(xI, . . . , x,) for a 
number of quantifier-free sentences v(t:, . . . , t:), . . . , W(tf, . . . , t$ in A. 
[Indeed, by adding a number of @I), (C) or (P) inferences under the conclusion 
A of 9, we obtain A’. Take the resulting derivation as 9’.] 
4.4.4. Definition. Let A be a sequent consisting of prenex sentences only. For 
each prenex sentence Q, = Q,x, 9 . . Q,x,, ~(x,, . . . , x,) in A, for each Qi in 
c&x, . * * Qnx, which is an occurrence of V, we introduce: 
(i) a new individual constant k, if Qixi * * * Qi-[xi-1 contains no occurrence of 
3; we call k the individual constant associated with Qi in q; 
(ii) a new m-ary function constant f, if Qj,, . . . , Qj_ are all occurrences of 3 in 
Q,x, . . . Q,_lxi_,, 1 G i, < . . . <i, c i - 1; we call f the function constant as- 
sociated with Qi in cp. 
4.4.5. Definition. Let A be a sequent consisting of prenex sentences only. The 
functional form of A is obtained as follows. For each prenex sentence 
Q)~Q~x~...Q~x,~(x~,..., x,) in A, for each 0; in Q,x, . . . Qnx, which is an 
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occurrence of V, let ~7~ be the sentence obtained deleting C&x, from q and 
replacing each occurrence of xi in q by: 
(i) k, if Qrxr * * . Qi-*Xi_r contains no occurrence of 3, where k is the 
individual constant associated with C!i in q; 
(ii) f(xi,, . . . , Xi,,,), if Qi,, . . . , Qi,,, are all occurrences of 3 in 
Q,x,...Qi_lxi_l, l~i,<...<i,~i-l, where f is the function constant 
associated with ei in rp. 
The sentence Al+ is called the functional form of q. [Clearly qt is an existential 
sentence.] 
4.4.6. Example. Let f be the function constant associated with Vy in 
3x Vy (Px+ Py). Then the functional form of 3x Vy (Px+ Py) is 3x (Z’x ---, P’x). 
4.4.7. Theorem (Second uniformity theorem). Every pure normal derivation 9 
in NC, with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent A consisting of 
prenex sentences only, can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9’ with 
no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent A’ consisting of quantifer- 
free sentences only, such that every inference in 9’ is a propositional or a 
structural inference. 
Specifically, A’ contains a number of quantifier-free sentences of the form 
x(tf,, . . . , tt,), . . . , x(tE,, . . . , Q for each prenex sentence 
0,.x, . . . Qnx, $r(xl, . . . , x,) in A, where 3x,, * - - 3xnq x(x,,, , . . . , x,J is the 
functional form of Qlxl . . . Q,x, q(xI, . . . , x,). [Here tk,, . . . , tf,,, for 1 <i up, 
are closed terms built up from the individual and function constants occurring in 
9, from the individual and function constants occurring in 
3x,, * * * %lq x(x,, , . . . , x,J, and from k,.] 
Proof. By 4.3.7, 9 can be transformed into a pure normal derivation gdl with no 
open assumptions and with conclusion A, whose midsequent is a quantifier-free 
sequent Or. We modify ‘& by the following procedure. 
Starting from the conclusion and moving up, for every (VI) inference n we 
proceed as follows. Let A, Qixi * * . Qnx, x(x,, . . . , x,) be the conclusion of n (SO 
that Qi is an occurrence of V), and let ~1= Qlxl . * * Qnx, +(x1, . . . , x,) be the 
prenex sentence in A belonging to the same end track as 
QiXi * * * Qn~n X(xi, * . . 7 x,) (so that the latter is a subformula of q). We replace 
each occurrence of the proper parameter a of n by: 
(i) k, if Qrxr.. * Qi-rXi_r contains no occurrence of 3, where k is the 
individual constant associated with Qi in 9; 
(ii) f (ui,, . . . , Ui,), if Qi,, . . . , Q, are all occurrences of 3 in 
Qrx, . . . Qi-rxi-r, where f is the function constant associated with Qi in Q, and 
. . . ) uj are the quasi-terms occurring in place of xi,, . . . , xim in 
. * * QJ,x(xi, . . . 2 Xn). 
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Such replacements spoil the (VI) inferences, and hence the part of 9~~ standing 
below Oi, but do not spoil the part of 9, ending with Oi, say Z$, because the 
latter contains propositional and structural inferences only. Let 0, be the sequent 
resulting from O1 and Z$ the derivation resulting from 8, by these replacements. 
If 0, contains individual parameters or c-terms, we replace all such individual 
parameters or c-terms by ki (see 2.1.5). Let O3 be the sequent resulting from 0, 
and Z& the derivation resulting from & by these further replacements. [Again, %‘* 
is not spoiled because it contains propositional and structural inferences only.] If 
we put 9’ = $, then clearly 9’ has the desired properties. 0 
4.4.8. Example. The derivation shown below on the left is transformed succes- 
sively into the derivations shown on the right by the procedure given in the proof 
of 4.4.7. [Like in 4.4.6 we assume that f is the function constant associated with 
Vy in 3x Vy (PC+ Py).] 
(1) 
(+I) pa 
(W) 
Pb+ Pa 
(+I) 
Pb + Pa, PC 
Pb+ Pa, Pa- Pc 
(1) 
(VI) 
(31) 
Pb+ Pa, Vy (Pa+ Py) 
(P) 
Pb-,Pa, 3xVy(Px+Py) 
(VI) 
3x Vy (Px+ Py), Pb- Pa 
(31) 
3x Vy (Px-‘Py), Vy (Pb- Py) 
(C) 
3x vy (Px+Py), 3x vy (Px+ Py) 
3x vy (Px- Py) 
l-3 
H 
(1) 
Pfa 
Pb+Pfb 
Pb+ Pfb, Pffb 
Pb-Pfb, Pfb+Pffb@) 
Pb-Pfb, VY (%+-PY) 
Pb - Pfb, 3x Vy (Px ---, Py) 
3x Vy (Px- Py), Pb- Pfb 
3x Vy (Px-, Py), Vy (Pb- Py) 
3x vy (Px+ Py), 3x vy (Px+ Py) 
3x vy (Px + Py ) 
(1) 
(+-I) PklT;fkl 
w 
(-+I) 
Pk,-+Pfk,, Pffk, 
Pk,+ Pfkl, Pfk,+ Pffk, 
(1) 
4.4.9. Remark. In 4.4.7, generally A’ must contain several sentences 
x($, . . . , C,), . . . > x(C,, * * . 3 6,) for each sentence Qix, . . - 
QA, v(x1, . . . 9 x,) in A. For example, while there is a derivation with no open 
assumptions whose conclusion is the sequent Pk,+ Pfkl, Pfk,+ Pffk, (as shown 
in 4.4.8), there is no derivation with no open assumptions whose conclusion is 
Pkl+ Pfk, (or Pfk, 4 Pffkl, for that matter). Indeed while Pkl+ Pfkl, Pfk,+ 
Pflk,, or equivalently (Pk,+ Pfk,) v (Pfk, * PffkJ, is a tautology [being of the 
form (r~+ v) v (W+ x)lj neither Pk,+ Pfk, nor Pfk,* Pffk, is a tautology. 
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4.4.10. Remark. The converse of 4.4.7 also holds. This can be established either 
by a straightforward semantical argument, like in Girard [7, p. 1211, or by a more 
involved combinatorial argument, similarly to Kleene [ll, pp. 346-3481 or Gallier 
[5, pp. 345-3491. 
4.4.11. Remark. On the relation of 4.4.7 to Herbrand’s theorem see van 
Heijenoort [25]. 
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